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COMMENT
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence went into effect. Presi-
dent Ford's signature on Public Law 93-595 was the culmination of nearly
twenty years of study, drafting, and debate. Obviously the decision to
codify federal evidence law was not lightly made, but the desire for uni-
formity ultimately made the Rules possible. As with all major legislation,
compromise was necessary and certain areas of the law were left un-
touched. Criminal presumptions represent one such area. In other areas,
such as privilege, only minimal codification was possible. The final result
is a good set of rules, but one which might not be uniformly applied.
Most of the debate is expected to continue in the areas of privilege,
presumption, character and hearsay. The purpose of this note is to ana-
lyze these controversial portions of the Rules and compare them with exist-
ing federal and Virginia common law. This approach should enable the
practising attorney to make a smooth transition to the new world of statu-
tory rules of evidence.
II. SCOPE
The Rules do not apply to all proceedings within federal jurisdiction.
Rule 1101 details when the Rules apply in whole or in part.' Its provisions
may seem complicated, but a useful rule of thumb has been.suggested and
is reprinted here.
Whenever The Judge (or Magistrate, or Referee in Bankruptcy, or Court of
Claims Commissioner) is presiding over a proceeding to determine one of the
material or ultimate facts in the dispute between the parties, the new Federal
Rules of Evidence govern. With the exception of Rules of privilege which
apply at all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings, the Rules do not
ordinarily govern preliminary stages of litigation, criminal or civil, or prelimi-
nary fact-finding relating to the application of an evidentiary Rule as op-
posed to fact-finding relating to the merits of the case. 2
It should be noted that a distinction is drawn between preliminary pro-
ceedings and actual adjudications, and that rules of privilege are given
special treatment. In addition, the Rules are expressly made inapplicable
1. FED. R. Evi. 1101.
2. K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 387 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as REDDEN & SALTBURG].
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to grand jury proceedings, preliminary hearings on criminal cases, proceed-
ings for extradition or rendition, sentencing and probation revocation hear-
ings, and proceedings for a warrant, summons or bail.' Part (e) of Rule 1101
makes the Rules applicable in part to certain proceedings governed by
existing statutes to the extent that evidentiary matters are not covered in
those statutes. Finally, the Rules do not expressly cover District of Colum-
bia "local" courts, the Tax Court or the military tribunals; however,
these courts may elect to follow the Rules.'
Im. PRESUMPTIONS
In certain instances, the law grants one party the benefit of a presump-
tion. One of the most familiar of these is the presumption of innocence in
a criminal case. The defendant need present no proof whatsoever and may
rely entirely on this presumption for his case. The Rules, however, do not
deal with criminal presumptions, and their application to civil presump-
tions requires more analysis than the familiar example above.
A presumption could be described as a legal, and often logical, inference
derived from established facts. A presumption must normally rest on some
basic facts from which the ultimate fact will then be presumed. Such a
situation might arise in a case contesting the death of an insured. The
party with the burden of proving death which is the ultimate fact, (i.e. the
beneficiary), may do so with a presumption. Once there is evidence of an
unexplained absence for the required statutory period, the basic facts have
been established and death is legally presumed. Since a presumption may
be the determining factor in a case, the rules that govern a presumption's
effect and rebuttability are of great significance to the practitioner.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, as initially proposed, contained three
sections relating to presumptions.' Rule 303 dealing with criminal pre-
sumptions was eliminated,' but Rules 301 and 302 were modified and
3. FED. R. EviD. 1101(d).
4. REDDEN & SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 387.
5. J. SCHMERT, PROPOSED FED. R. EvID., Rules 301-03, at 48-54 (1974).
6. Proposed Rule 303 defined recognized criminal presumptions and expressly forbade the
judge to direct the jury to find a presumed fact against the accused. However, where the
presumed fact established guilt or an element of the offense, the judge could submit the fact
to the jury if that fact could be found beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the presumed fact
had a lesser effect, the judge could submit it to the jury when its existence was supported by
the weight of the evidence. Id. at 52.
The rule was deleted by the House of Representatives since the Judiciary Committee
wished to review the entire matter of criminal presumptions in light of proposed changes in
Title 18 of the United States Code. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. Naws, 7075, 7079 (1974).
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retained for civil actions and proceedings.'
The Rules, as adopted, treat the burden of proof as composed of two
elements: the burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden
of persuasion. Under Rule 301 a presumption shifts the burden of going
forward with the evidence but does not shift the burden of persuasion.' If
the party against whom a presumption operates offers no contradictory
evidence, the court must instruct that the ultimate fact may be presumed
(assuming the basic facts have been established).' However, once evidence
contradicting the presumption is offered, the court cannot instruct on the
presumption itself but may instruct the jury that they may infer the ulti-
mate fact from the basic facts." In the latter case, the jury will be left to
evaluate two opposing inferences: one raised by facts logically supporting
the presumption, and one raised by facts tending to defeat such an as-
sumption.
While the Rules do not state how much evidence is necessary to rebut a
presumption, it is probably that amount necessary to avoid a directed
verdict." Whatever the amount, once a presumption is rebutted the trier
of fact is left with a permissible inference only. The inference acquires no
special status merely because it was once a presumption. 2
The effect of Rule 301 is in accord with federal case law." A presumption
is not evidence and may not be balanced against evidence of a fact. Once
a fact in conflict with a presumption is proven, the presumption disappears
and the fact so proven must be found. 4 However, since a rebutted pre-
7. FED. R. Evm. 301 & 302 provide:
Rule 301. In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption,
but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-
persuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was origi-
nally cast.
Rule 302. In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact
which is an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision is determined in accordance with State law.
8. FED. R. Evm. 301.
9. CONFEREN cE REP. No. 1597, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 7098,
7099 (1974). The Senate's Amendment to Rule 301 was the version finally adopted by Con-
gress. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 U.S. CODE CONC. & ADAMN. NEws, 7051, 7056
(1974).
10. Id.
11. See REDDEN & SAL7zBURG, supra note 2, at 48. But see 8 Cyc. FED. PROC. § 26.289 (3rd
ed. 1968).
12. See note 9 supra.
13. 8 Cyc. FED. PROC. § 26.290 (3d ed. 1968).
14. See Blakeslee v. Smith, 26 F. Supp. 28 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 110 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1940).
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sumption may leave an inference from the basic facts, this inference will
usually be considered by the trier of fact as tending to disprove contradic-
tory facts. Thus, the presumption itself will receive no evidentiary weight,
but any inference established from the underlying facts may.'5
The Virginia law on presumptions is basically the same as that in Rule
301 with two possible exceptions.'5 In some cases Virginia requires (a) a
shift in the burden of persuasion, and (b) a greater quantum of evidence
to rebut a presumption.
As noted earlier, the burderi of persuasion does not shift under Rule
301.'" This is the rule in Virginia for most presumptions,'" but there are a
few exceptions. While the cases are not always clear, the following pre-
sumptions seem to require more evidence for rebuttal than that required
by the Federal Rules: presumption that death was accidental in some
insurance cases,'" presumption that a lost will was destroyed by the testa-
tor,' presumption of sanity in some cases," and the presumption of an
heir's legitimacy. " In these exceptions the burden of persuasion does shift,
and the opponent must rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the
evidence."
Rule 302 requires federal courts to use state presumptions in civil cases
''respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to which
State law supplies the rule of decision ... "' Since this rule is limited
to civil actions and proceedings, the more involved problems found in
criminal presumptions are not in issue. 5 All that is necessary for a state
presumption to qualify under this rule is (a) that it have a rational connec-
15. See McGrew's Estate v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1943).
16. See generally M. MARSHALL, J. FITZHUGH & J. HELVIN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA
AND WEST VIRGINIA §§ 208-15 (C. Nash ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as MARSHALL, FrrzHUGH
& HELVIN].
17. See note 7 Supra.
18. See MARSHALL, FITZHUGH & HELVIN, 18, supra note 16, at § 211.
19. Id. § 217.
20. Id. § 225.
21. Id. § 233.
22. Id. § 240.
23. Id. § 211, at 376 & n.41.
24. See note 7 supra.
25. See Skagen, Presumptions, 27 ARK. L. Rv. 187, 196-97 (1973). Since the state must
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, only permissive presumptions may be used (i.e., jury
may but is not required to find the presumed fact). Furthermore, a presumption need only
be rebutted by a reasonable doubt and the burden of proof is never shifted from the state.
These factors must be considered in addition to the rational-connection test of Mobile, J. &
K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
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tion with the facts proven, 26 (b) that it relate to a fact which is an element
of a claim or defense in issue,2 and (c) that the issue be one properly
determined by state law.2
Part (a) of this three part rule is a constitutional restriction and will only
apply to state substantive rather than procedural presumptions.2 As such,
the Rule follows Erie v. Tompkins," which requires federal courts to apply
state substantive and federal procedural law in cases where federal sub-
stantive law is not controlling. Although conflicts about what is substan-
tive and what is procedural abound, the Rule is a codification o' the Erie
doctrine for presumptions.3' Part (c) of Rule 302 goes even further, how-
ever, to clarify and expand Erie's application to presumptions by reaching
cases "as to which State law supplies the rule of decision. . . ." This
particular wording has special judicial significance and requires precise
application. For this purpose, rules of decision have been defined as "the
rules and principles which guide the conduct and rights of all persons in
all courts where applicable. '32 Furthermore, in keeping with modem inter-
pretations of Erie, the rule is not to be limited merely to diversity cases.3
While apparently clear, Rule 302 is attendant with application prob-
lems. Aside from all of the usual Erie problems in distinguishing substance
from procedure, 34 there could be some confusion between Rules 301 and
302.15
State law may differ from Rule 301 in dealing with the effect of a pre-
sumption when rebutted, in the amount of evidence necessary for rebuttal,
and on a presumption's effect on the burden of persuasion. However, Rule
301 expressly states that it is subject to the other rules, and thus Rule 302
would govern any time state law supplies the rule of decision. Conse-
26. See Minski v. United States, 131 F.2d 614 (6th Cir.), afl'd, 319 U.S. 463 (1942).
27. FED. R. Evm. 302.
28. Id.
29. See 8 Cyc. FED. PRoc. § 26.267 (3d ed. 1968).
30. 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
31. FED. R. Ev. 302 (Advisory Committee's Note).
32. Skagen, Presumptions, 27 ARK. L. REv. 187, 192 (1973).
33. The Advisory Committee stated that while Erie was a diversity case, it has been
applied to any claim or issue having its source in state law. FED. R. Evm. 302 (Advisory
Committee's Note), citing Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection, 48 IowA L. REv. 248,
257 (1963); H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 697
(1953); I MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTiCE, para. 0.305 [3] (2d ed. 1965); WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS
217-18 (1963).
34. Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARv. L. Rev. 741 (1974); Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of
Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693 (1974).
35. P. RomsTEmn, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 51-
52 (1973).
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quently, an attorney must be prepared to argue for admission of not only
the presumption, but also its effect when rebutted and the amount of
evidence necessary for rebuttal.
The language of Rule 302 seems to encompass all of these other aspects
of presumptions by saying the "effect of a presumption," but there is room
for confusion and court interpretation. Can it reasonably be said that the
burden of proof necessary to rebut a presumption is an "effect" of the
presumption? If not, then Rule 302 would seem to require the application
of a state presumption, but allow rebuttal evidence to be measured by a
federal standard,"0 and then a return to state standards for a determination
of the presumption's effect once rebutted. Such problems may be resolved
within a judge's discretion 7 and will probably depend at least in part on
the state policies behind a particular presumption," since the rule "appar-
ently reflects notions of comity" between federal and state courts." Thus,
Rule 302 is basically a flexible codification of existing federal case law.4
IV. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence includes the new law on
permissible character evidence. The statutory version is generally consis-
tent with both federal law and Virginia common law, but there are a few
significant changes.
Before these changes can be discussed, however, a general explanation
of legal relevancy under Article IV is necessary since this is the basis for
excluding character evidence. The definition of relevancy in Rule 401 forms
a foundation for the rest of the article.
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
36. No federal standard has been established by the Rules, and as suggested in the text
infra, the point may be subject to some litigation.
37. These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination
of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the
law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined. FED. R. EVID. 102.
38. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1950). See also Judicial
Conference, 48 F.R.D. 39, 69-72 (2d Cir. 1969); Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Di-
lemma Facing Draftsmen of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. Rzv. 353, 363-75
(1969).
39. REDDEN & SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 57.
40. See FED. R. EvID. 302 (Advisory Committee's Note). But see Sherman, Analysis of
Federal Decisions Dealing with Evidence Published During 1967, 69 CoLum. L.REv. 377, 379
(1969). Statistics seem to suggest that state rules of decision were not always followed in
federal courts where their application was possible. Such a result, however, is understandable
considering the interpretation problems surrounding Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
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existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.'
This definition is in keeping with existing federal law, although there have
been slight interpretational differences between the circuits."2 While not
phrased in the same language, the application of this Rule is also consis-
tent with Virginia practice.
However, the lenient admissibility provisions of Rule 401 must be con-
sidered with the limitations imposed by Rules 402 and 403." Of particular
significance is the amount of judicial discretion afforded in Rule 403, lim-
ited only by the categories defined therein. These guidelines provide con-
siderable latitude for the court's decision to exclude relevant evidence and,
as such, recognize traditional common law principles. 5
Character evidence, though often "relevant" as the term is defined in
Rule 401, is usually excluded because other interests outweigh the contri-
bution such evidence may make to the case. While Rule 403 provides for
this judicial determination of legal relevancy, Rule 404 limits this discre-
tion. Rule 404 is a general rule of exclusion with limited exceptions and
was apparently drafted to apply to both civil and criminal cases. While the
rule's general terms are not so limited, exceptions (1) and (2) are clearly
applicable to criminal cases only.
(a) Character evidence generally.-Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused.-Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim.-Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
41. FED. R. Evm. 401.
42. See MCCORMICK ON EvmENCE § 185, at 437-38 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK].
43. Authorities have characterized Virginia law as admitting "all facts having a rational
probative value ... unless some specific rule forbids." MARSHALL, FrrzHUGH & HELVIN, supra
note 16, § 75, at 123 n.6, citing I WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 10, at 293 (3d ed. 1940).
44. FED. R. Evm. 402 & 403 provide:
Rule 402. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 403. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
45. FED. R. Evm. 403 (Advisory Committee's Note).
19751
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same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered
by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was
the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness.-Evidence of the character of a witness, as pro-
vided in rules 607, 608, and 609.46
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.-Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that
he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."7
Character is excluded under the rule any time its admission is sought
to prove conforming conduct. But when character is an operative issue of
a claim or defense, it will be legally relevant and admissible."
Exceptions (1) and (2) of Rule 404(a) merely codify federal case law and
allow the prosecution to rebut character evidence put in issue by a criminal
defendant." The language of these sections limits their applicability to
criminal cases and is consistent with the general view that character is
irrelevant in a civil case." However, the search for admissibility cannot be
confined to Rule 404; even in a civil case, once character is in issue it
becomes relevant and admissible under Rule 402. Defamation and mal-
practice cases are two examples in which character would be at issue and
thus relevant. There is also authority for making character relevant in any
civil case where "moral intent is marked and prominent in the nature of
the issue. .,, As this type of evidence arguably falls outside the prohi-
bition of Rule 404(a), it might be admissible under Rule 402 as relevant
evidence offered in mitigation of damages.
Part (a) (3) of Rule 404 greatly complicates the area of relevant character
46. These sections are discussed in detail infra.
47. FED. R. Evm. 404.
48. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
49. See I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 58, 62, 63 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
50. See I WIGMORE § 64. But see United States v. Genovese, 133 F. Supp. 820 (D.N.J. 1955)
(admitted defendant's character evidence in fraudulent citizenship action).
51. I WIGMORE § 64, at 478-79. Virginia cases, however, seem to be limited to actions in
which character is in issue. See Weatherford v. Birchett, 158 Va. 741, 164 S.E. 535 (1932)
(libel and slander); Fry v. Leslie, 87 Va. 269, 12 S.E. 671 (1891) (seduction).
West Virginia has taken a more expansive position and allows character evidence in mitiga-
tion of puntive damages in an assault, Raines v. Faulkner, 131 W. Va. 10, 48 S.E.2d 393
(1947); or breach of promise to marry when defendant's character was attacked, Dent v.
Pickens, 34 W. Va. 240, 12 S.E. 698 (1890). Both West Virginia and Virginia have allowed
character evidence to determine if there was probable cause to mitigate damages in a mali-
cious prosecution case. Southern Ry. v. Mosby, 112 Va. 169, 70 S.E. 517 (1911); Clairborne
v. C. & O.R.R., 46 W. Va. 363, 33 S.E. 262 (1899); Vindal v. Core, 18 W.Va. 1 (1881).
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evidence since the practitioner must apply the Rules in Article VI, which
deal with the character of witnesses. Rule 607 allows an attack on any
witness' credibility by either party.52 When read in conjunction with Rule
404, this means that character evidence is admissible to impeach a witness
and may be offered by either party without the traditionally required
showing of surprise or hostility when impeaching one's own witness."
Furthermore, Rule 405 allows this proof in either reputation or opinion
form.5' But it should be noted that Rule 607 is absolute; thus, credibility
may apparently be attacked with any type of relevant evidence.5
Rule 608 details when reputation, opinion and/or specific acts may be
used to attack or support witness credibility." Inquiries may be as to the
past acts of a witness or to those acts of any other witness about whose
character he has testified.57 However, when a witness is questioned about
his past conduct, he retains the privilege against self-incrimination." As
is the majority rule, credibility can only be supported if attacked, and all
52. "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling
him." FED. R. Evm. 607.
53. MCCORMICK § 38, at 76 citing Comment, 49 VA. L. Rnv. 996, 1009 (1963). See III A
WmNORE § 905 n.6 and VA. CODE ANN. § 8-292 (Repl. Vol. 1957) for the federal and Virginia
positions supporting the common law rule against impeaching one's own witness.
54. See note 105 infra.
55. The Advisory Committee on FED. R. Evm. 607 points out an additional change when
impeachment is sought through prior statements. Such statements are not hearsay under
Rule 801(d)(1) and may thus be admitted for their truth and not merely for impeachment.
This liberality departs from previous federal law and existing Virginia law. See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8-292 (Repl. Vol. 1957); McCoRMCK § 251, at 61.
56. (a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character.-The credibility of a witness
may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but
subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthful-
ness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after
the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation
evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct.-Specific instances of the conduct of a witness,
for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime
as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however,
in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired
into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness
or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testi-
fied.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not
operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination when examined with
respect to matters which relate only to credibility. FED. R. Evm. 608.
57. FED. R. EvED. 608(b).
58. Id. This rule is essential in light of constitutional decisions. See, e.g., Griffin v. Califor-
nia, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
1975]
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evidence is limited to the particular trait of truthfulness rather than to bad
character in general.59
Part (b) of Rule 608 admits evidence of specific acts to reflect on a
witness' character for truth and veracity but only in narrowly defined
situations. Some criminal convictions will be admitted under Rule 609 and
are provable with extrinsic evidence."9 All other specific acts will only be
admitted if in the judge's discretion they are "probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness." 1 However, the judge's discretion will be influenced by the
exclusion factors of Rule 403 in which prejudice, confusion and delay are
balanced against relevance.2 These specific acts may not be proven by
extrinsic evidence (i.e., the examiner will be bound by the witness' answer)
and may only be explored on cross-examination. 3
A discretionary use of specific acts to prove or disprove a witness' truth-
fulness is consistent with previous federal law and existing Virginia law. 4
The Rules are, however, less concerned with the method of examination
employed. They do not require the traditional method of examination in
which a witness was questioned about an "alleged or reputed" act of an-
other."5 In so doing, the Congress has followed Wigmore's rationale for
eliminating this formalism, 9 while at the same time imposing necessary
safeguards to prevent abuse. 7 While there is no express requirement that
the examining party use good faith in questioning about specific acts, 9 the
59. 111A WIGMORE § 923 n.2. For a good discussion of Virginia's position see 16 VA. L. Rxv.
733 (1930); Lendvay v. Sobgito, 211 Va. 548, 178 S.E.2d 532 (1971).
60. In the report of the House and Senate Conferees, crimes of dishonesty and false state-
ment were to include such crimes as perjury, criminal fraud, embezzlement, false pretense
or "any other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some
element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to
testify truthfully." REDDEN & SALTZBUMG, supra note 2, at 192.
61. FED. R. Evm. 608(b).
62. FED. R. Evm. 403.
63. FED. R. Evw. 608(b).
64. I1 A WIGMORE § 987 n.1, at 907.
65. McCoRMIcK § 191 n.74, at 457. See also Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 1258 (1956); Kanter v.
Commonwealth, 171 Va. 524, 199 S.E. 477 (1938).
66. See IM A WIGMORE § 988, at 920-21, wherein three reasons for eliminating this form of
question are given: (1) such testimony violates the fundamental rule of fairness noted in §
979 (i.e. the jury will still associate the witness with the act); (2) specific acts are introduced
with hearsay, and (3) the party wronged has no defense against such statements.
67. The Court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interro-
gating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consump-
tion of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. FED.
R. EVID. 611(a).
68. Kanter v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 524, 199 S.E. 477 (1938) (cross-examination con-
fined to the limits of good faith and fair dealing). See also Annot., 71 A.L.R. 1504 (1931).
[Vol. 10: 169
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language of Rule 611 should easily encompass such a requirement.,9
Rule 609 completes the trilogy of sections explaining the admissibility
of a witness' character."° It is divided into five parts which delineate what
type crimes will be admissible to test credibility and what effect subse-
quent events will have on their admissibility. Part (a) establishes the gen-
eral rule that evidence of a crime committed by a witness may always be
received during cross-examination if it involved dishonesty or a false state-
ment. In addition, the court may admit evidence of any crime punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year if the probative value of
the evidence outweighs its prejudice. The remaining four parts codify
standards for admissibility when other factors such as intervening time or
an appeal relate to the crime.'
69. FED. R. Evm. 611(a).
70. (a) General rule.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime may be elicited from him or established
by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was con-
victed, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit.-Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period
of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of
the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later
date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value
of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially out-
weighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old
as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party
sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation.-Evidence of a con-
viction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a
pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based
on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been
convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment
or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications.-Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not ad-
missible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of
a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense
would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal.-The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evi-
dence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissi-
ble. FED. R. Evin. 609.
71. Id.
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Rule 609(a) restates existing law for both the federal and Virginia
courts.7 2 Note, however, that nondefendant witnesses are not spared the
barbs of a searching cross-examination. The only prejudice considered is
that of the defendant. Thus, a nondefendant witness can still be subject
to considerable embarrassment when the past ten years of his life include
a felony conviction. Parts (b) through (e) add specificity and limitations
to the rule's general admissibility grant. The ten-year limitation found in
part (a) was not previously recognized in either federal or Virginia law but
was adopted for "practical considerations of fairness and relevancy."' 3
However, the judge still has discretion to admit older convictions once
opposing counsel has received written notice of intent and a chance to
contest the admission.74
Similar policy considerations apparently affected part (c) of Rule 609
which controls the effect of a pardon on a conviction's admissibility. Once
a person has been rehabilitated, the state has, at least in form, vouched
for his credibility. 5 As such, if he has not been subsequently convicted of
another crime punishable by death or imprisonment of a year or more, he
may not be impeached with the conviction." Such a rule is commendable
and certainly in keeping with a policy of restoring a convict's rights once
he has been rehabilitated. Note, also, that unlike parts (a) , (b) and (d),
there is no judicial discretion allowed in part (c). The prohibition is abso-
lute once a proper showing of rehabilitation has been made. Furthermore,
while it is not clear who has the burden of proof on subsequent convictions,
it would seem wise for presenting counsel to be prepared with a clean
record if challenged or so requested by the court.
Past juvenile adjudications are covered in Rule 609(d) and are generally
not admissible. However, where the offense involves dishonesty or false
statement, it may be admitted if the court is satisfied that it is "necessary
for a fair determination" of guilt or innocence. 8
72. See generally 1I A WIGMORE § 987; Harmon v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 442, 185 S.E.2d
48 (1971) (admissibility of felony convictions); McLane v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 197, 116
S.E.2d 274 (1960) (court's duty to prevent improper cross-examination); VA. CODE ANN. §
19.1-265 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
73. FED. R. EVID. 609(b) (Advisory Committee's Note).
74. FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
75. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1112, 172 S.E. 286 (1934) (pardon held admissi-
ble to rehabilitate witness impeached with former conviction).
76. FED. R. EviD. 609(c).
77. Under the Rules, only pardons based on a finding of rehabilitation will exclude an
otherwise impeachable prior conviction. When a pardon is based on rehabilitation, the crimi-
nal conviction loses its relevance as an impeachable offense. See I A WIGMORE § 980(3) n.3.
78. FED. R. EVID. 609(d).
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Before the new rules became law, juvenile proceedings were generally not
admissible for impeachment purposes in federal courts." The rationale
behind this rule is found in Cotton v. United States,"0 wherein the court
stated:
[Tihe appellant has not been convicted of a crime or even prosecuted as a
criminal under the Juvenile Delinquency Act [18 U.S.C. § 5032]. The adju-
dication of a status rather than the conviction of a crime would seem to fall
within the rationale of the rule which generally excludes evidence of arrest
or indictment without conviction. 81
In addition, the Advisory Committee noted that other policy factors tend
toward exclusion. Juvenile hearings are informal, generally of a confiden-
tial nature, and frequently less proof is required for an ultimate decision
than in a criminal case. 2 Furthermore, since juvenile hearings are designed
to foster counselling and rehabilitation rather than to punish as in a crimi-
nal trial, they should not have the same value for impeachment as does a
criminal conviction.8
However, by allowing admission of the juvenile adjudication in some
instances, the rule expressly recognizes Wigmore's criticism of absolute
exclusion.
A typical delinquent is a girl of corrupt environment or nymphomaniac tend-
ency; such a girl is often the cause of injustice to an innocent man by making
false charges of rape or indecent liberties ... ; and the revelations in the
juvenile court may be the best or even the only means of exposing the testi-
monial untrustworthiness of the witness.'"
The Rules have thus adopted the best of both worlds and allow some
flexibility in keeping with their general truth-seeking purpose.
Virginia law on the admissibility of juvenile actions for impeachment is
well settled. Kiracofe v. Commonwealth"' is a leading case for the exclusion
of past juvenile proceedings. The court quoted section 16.1-179 which pro-
vides:
Except as otherwise provided, no adjudication or judgment upon the status
79. FED. R. Evm. 609 (Advisory Committee's Note (d)), citing Cotton v. United States, 355
F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966) and Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
80. 355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966).
81. Id. at 482, citing Im A WIGMORE §§ 980(a), 982, 985-87.
82. See FED. R. Evm. 609 (Advisory Committee Note (d)).
83. Ladd, Some Highlights of the New Federal Rules of Evidence, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. RPv.
191, 225-27 (1973).
84. 11 A WIGMORE § 980, at 834.
85. 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957).
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of any child under the provisions of this law shall operate to impose any of
the disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction for a crime .... 81
However, the court never fully considered section 16.1-162 of the 1950 Code
which provided a discretionary disclosure of juvenile records to those per-
sons with a direct interest therein. 7 In light of the "except as otherwise
provided" language of section 16.1-179, discretionary disclosure would
seem to have been permitted for impeachment purposes.
Amendments to section 16.1-162 have not clarified the situation, but
new arguments are now available to both sides. The amended statute reads
in part as follows:
Except as hereinafter provided, the records of all such [juvenile] cases...
shall be withheld from public inspection but they shall be open to the child's
parents and attorney and to such other persons as the judge or the judge of
a court of record in his discretion decides have a proper interest therein;
provided, however, that in cases involving criminal offenses by juveniles, the
judge may make public the name of the offender, the names of the parents
of the offender and the nature of the offense, if he deems it to be in the public
interest.8
The "except as hereinafter" language of amended section 16.1-162 brings
this section within the general exclusion of section 16.1-179. However, as
noted above, section 16.1-179 has similar language so the two sections
make mutual exceptions, and neither is expressly excluded by the other.
The policy statement in the annotations to section 16.1-179, however,
seems to favor exclusion.89 On the other hand, the express language of
section 16.1-162 permits public disclosure of criminal juvenile offenses.
When considered alone, it is consistent with Rule 609(d) and in keeping
with Wigmore's philosophy to prevent injustice."
While there is no case law on point, there is dicta supporting the position
86. Id. at 844, 97 S.E.2d at 21; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-179 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-162 (Cum. Supp. 1956), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1975) reads
in part:
The records of all such [juvenile] cases, .... shall be withheld from public inspec-
tion but they shall be open to [those persons] [who] the judge . . . decides have a
direct interest therein.
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-162 (Cum. Supp. 1975)
89. Statutes of this character originated in a policy not to permit the same uses to
be made of records of juvenile courts as are frequently made of criminal records of
courts of general jurisdiction, for the reason that juvenile proceedings are corrective in
nature rather than penal. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-179 (Repl. Vol. 1960), as construed in
Kiracofe v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957).
90. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (Advisory Committee's Note (d)); I WIGMORE § 196; MI A
WIGMORE §§ 924a, 980.
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that a juvenile adjudication is admissible for impeachment purposes in
Virginia. In Cradle v. Peyton," the court noted that "[j]uvenile court
proceedings that result in confinement may be deemed the equivalent of
trials."9 Although the court was considering the due process implications
of In re Gault," its language recognized the criminal trial nature of some
juvenile proceedings. With this recognition, the value of juvenile proceed-
ings for impeachment purposes has been increased and, in a proper case,
may be admissible under section 16.1-162.
The only other case which considered section 16.1-162 was Woody v.
Commonwealth," in which the Commonwealth sought to exclude evidence
of prior juvenile acts on the authority of Kiracofe.95 The court did not reach
any decision on section 16.1-162 but distinguished Kiracofe since in Woody
there had yet been no formal juvenile proceedings. Testimony of juvenile
prosecution witnesses about prior burglaries still pending trial was admis-
sible to show possible bias in favor of the Commonwealth. In so ruling, the
court provided at least some basis for arguing that section 16.1-162 is
authority for admitting a prior juvenile proceeding for impeachment pur-
poses.
The above considerations may be of minimal importance, however, if
Virginia follows the West Virginia Supreme Court in State v. Thomas."
There the court held that a prior conviction would be admissible where the
juvenile had been tried as an adult. West Virginia's law on the exclusion
of juvenile convictions is similar to Virginia's, 7 and both states provide for
conviction of certain juvenile offenses in a court of record capable of impos-
ing full criminal penalties." Since the Commonwealth would generally
seek to transfer impeachable offenses, the fact that a witness was a juvenile
when convicted may rarely bar admission of the record in the future.
Finally, part (e) of Rule 609 makes a conviction admissible regardless
of a pending appeal. Evidence of the appeal is, hoivever, admissible as a
qualifying circumstance. This treatment is consistent with the majority of
91. 208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 874 (1967).
92. Id. at 248, 156 S.E.2d at 878.
93. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
94. 214 Va. 296, 199 S.E.2d 529 (1973).
95. 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957).
96. - W. Va. -, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974).
97. Compare W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-3 (1966) with VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-179 (Repl. Vol.
1960).
98. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-3 (1966) (juvenile courts denied jurisdiction for capital
offenses); VA. COD ANN. § 16.1-176 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (permissive transfer from juvenile
court to a court of record).
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federal decisions" and apparently with Virginia law."°' In making evidence
of an appeal admissible, the Rules have also solidified one small area of
conflict between the federal circuits. Federal courts have differed in their
treatment of rehabilitating explanations. 01 The Virginia decisions are clear
on this point, however, and have allowed explanations to rehabilitate a
witness limited only by considerations of irrelevance, issue confusion and
wasted time."' The Rules, in allowing evidence of an appeal, have provided
a witness with at least one approach to rehabilitation. By shedding even a
slight doubt on the finality of conviction, the jury is given some basis for
accepting the witness' testimony if they so desire.
Part (b) of Rule 404 codifies the existing common law on specific acts. 13
Specific acts, like other forms of character evidence, are generally inadmis-
sible to show conforming conduct, although there are well recognized
specific-acts exceptions."04 Exceptions are enumerated in Rule 404(b).
They include the use of such evidence to show motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Other provisions of the Rules"' provide for the use of specific acts in situa-
99. See United States v. Soles, 482 F.2d 105, 107 (2d Cir. 1973). Contra, Campbell v.
United States, 176 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See also Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 726 (1967);
MCCORMICK § 43, at 87 & n.66; 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 507(f), at 414 (1957).
100. It is clear that evidence of a prior convinction is inadmissible in a subsequent trial de
novo for the same offense. See Griffin v. Wilkerson, 335 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D. Va. 1972) citing
Malouf v. Roanoke, 177 Va. 846, 13 S.E.2d 319 (1941) and other cases. But there are no cases
that have directly decided whether a different crime pending an appeal is admissible. Futher-
more, the court from which appealed may affect admissibility. In Malouf v. Roanoke, supra
177 Va. at 855-56, 13 S.E.2d at 322, the court held that appeals from a court not of record
make "the judgment appealed from. . . completely annulled, and. . . not thereafter avail-
able for any purpose." This fact may be of small consequence, however, since most impeach-
able offenses will be originally tried in courts of record.
101. While the following cases do not deal expressly with an appeal's admissibility, they
do illustrate the way the courts have ruled on former conviction denials and explanations.
See generally United States v. Plante, 472 F.2d 829 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 950 (1973)
(refused to allow explanation); United States v. Crisafi, 304 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1962) (explana-
tion allowed subject to court's discretion); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v.
Rocco, 241 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1957) (explanation allowed subject to the court's discretion);
MCCORMICK § 43 nn. 83 & 84; IV WIGMORE § 1117(3).
102. See Kiracofe v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957); Coffey v. Common-
wealth, 188 Va. 629, 51 S.E.2d 215 (1949); Smith v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1112, 172 S.E.
286 (1934).
10j. MCCORMICK § 190 n.32. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
104. For an illustration of the rationale for excluding specific acts, see I WIGMORE § 194,
at 650 quoting Smith, Irrelevancy and Immateriality (State Bar Ass'n Proceedings) TEXAS
L. REV. Special Number at 220 (Oct. 1923).
105. (a) Reputation or Opinion.-In all cases in which evidence of character or a
trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry
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tions which were recognized at common law. '
Rule 405 makes a significant departure from common law. Part (a) of
the Rule provides for character to be proven with either reputation or
opinion evidence. At common law, proof of character was only permitted
through reputation,' 7 although specific acts could be explored on cross-
examination.' 8 It is significant to note that the rule also eliminates pre-
vious restrictions on the form in which questions about specific acts could
be asked. ' The use of opinion evidence is limited by Rule 701 to those
opinions "(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b)
helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of
a fact in issue.""' Part (b) of Rule 405 codifies the existing common law
and makes specific acts admissible when character becomes an operative
issue."' This treatment is consistent with the previous rules discussed
which generally exclude character evidence except for the limited purpose
of establishing a pertinent trait"' such as truth and veracity."3
V. PRIVILEGE
Article V, consisting of only one rule, has been the subject of much
discussion and literature."' Rule 501 governs the applicability of the var-
ious state and federal privileges while it does not specifically delineate any
of them."'
is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct.-In cases in which character or a trait of character
of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be
made of specific instances of his conduct. FED. R. Evm. 405.
106. See Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 1258 (1956); McCoRMiCK § 187.
107. See MCCORMICK § 186; V WIGMORE § 1610. Virginia law is in accord but the courts
appear to have blurred the distinction between reputation and opinion. See Zirkle v. Com-
monwealth, 189 Va. 862, 55 S.E.2d 24 (1949) (opinion of people in the community); Mitchell
v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 541, 127 S.E. 368 (1925) (general reputation).
108. See Il A WIGMORE § 981; accord, Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 862, 55 S.E.2d 24
(1949); Kanter v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 524, 199 S.E. 477 (1938).
109. See note 65 supra and accompanying test.
110. FED. R. Evm. 701.
111. See MCCORMICK § 187; I WIGMORE §§ 202-13. See, e.g., Wilson v. Commonwealth, 132
Va. 824, 111 S.E. 96 (1922); Barker v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 820, 20 S.E. 776 (1894).
112. FED. R. Evm. 404(a).
113. FED. R. Evm. 609(a).
114. See REDDEN & SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 112-35. The only Rule to receive a greater
page allocation was Rule 803 on hearsay. See also 120 CONG. REc. 12253-54 (daily ed. Dec.
18, 1974).
115. Proposed Article V contained 13 rules delineating 9 separate privileges, all of which
were deleted when it appeared that a consensus could not be reached.
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Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions
and proceedings with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which
State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law."6
As adopted, this rule is "pregnant with litigious mischief. ' 1 7 The problems
arise in civil cases"' where there is a conflict between state and federal law.
The Rule has attempted to resolve these conflicts in accordance with
existing common law. The Hon. William L. Hungate, Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice stated: "The House rule of privi-
lege [as finally adopted] is .intended to leave the Federal law of privilege
where we found it. The Federal courts are to develop the law of privilege
on a case-by-case basis.""' 9
The second sentence of Rule 501, however, creates new problems in civil
cases. As in Rules 302 and 601, a party is faced with the language "a claim
or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision."'' 1 Thus
before one determines privilege applicability, he may have to wrestle with
the multitudinous questions that accompany Erie v. Tompkins.''
An additional problem is created when state and federal claims are tried
together. When the state and federal privilege laws conflict, two results are
possible. Either one body of law or the other will predominate over both
claims, or each claim will be tried under its own law of privilege. Professor
116. FED. R. EVID. 501.
117. SEN. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 7051, 7059
(1974).
118. The Rule's application should not prove difficult in criminal cases, since federal courts
have rarely used state rules of evidence under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See C. WmGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 93, at 409-10 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as WRIGHT]. FED. R. CRiM. P. 26 provides:
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by an act of Congress or by these rules. The admissibility of evi-
dence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when
an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience.
119. 120 CONG. REc. 12253-54 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974).
120. FED. R. EvID. 501.
121. 304 U.S. 64 (1937); See notes 29 & 34 supra and accompanying text.
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Wright has made an analysis of this point and urges that the interests
behind various privileges should control the outcome of each conflict.,2
As a matter of policy it seems appropriate that the states should not be
permitted to say when the federal courts must refrain from hearing useful
testimony in a matter involving federal law. A different result seems most
tenable in diversity litigation. . . . [Where] the litigation is on a state-
created right, there is no federal interest that justifies such an interference
with the state's decision that the relation [i.e., husband and wife, doctor and
patient, etc.] is more important than the litigation.l"
While the case law is unsettled, 2 at least one authority in the field has
urged a similar approach.'2 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, how-
ever, would have taken a different approach. Based on Rule 43(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (before amendment, 1975), the committee
would have had the court apply the rule favoring admissibility.2" In such
a situation the court would be able to make a quick determination of what
rule to apply to a particular piece of evidence without having to explore
the various state and federal interests behind different rules of privilege.
The position Congress eventually took on this subject was that Rule 501
should insure that "federal law should not supercede that of the States in
substantive areas such as privilege absent a compelling reason.'",, The
House Committee on the Judiciary went on to state that they believed that
"in civil cases in the federal courts where an element of a claim or defense
is not grounded upon a federal question, there is no federal interest strong
enough to justify departure from State policy."'2 The protection that this
legislative history affords state privilege rules is further buttressed by
federal statute. 1''. Under this statute, amendments to the Rules are sub-
mitted to Congress by the Supreme Court and automatically become law
in 180 days if no action is taken. However, any amendment creating,
abolishing, or modifying a privilege requires express approval by an act of
Congress.
As noted above, 2' there should be no problem in applying Rule 501 to
122. WRIGHT § 93.
123. Id. at 414-15.
124. Id. at 414.
125. REDDEN & SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 113.
126. SEN. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 7051, 7059
n.17 (1974).
127. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 7075, 7082
(1974).
128. Id.
128.1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2076 (1975).
129. Note 118 supra.
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criminal cases; however, in civil cases, one must look to the law which
supplies the rule of decision for the proper law of privilege. Some instances
will arise in which both federal and state law are involved. Since one item
of evidence may affect the application of both state and federal law, both
bodies of law must be examined for privilege. As a practical matter only
one privilege can be applied, and an advocate should be prepared to argue
the policy favoring the use of the desired privilege.
VI. HEARSAY
Created to insure judicial accuracy, the hearsay rule has developed
through a changing legal environment. The rule never excluded all hearsay
evidence, however. The need for first-hand knowledge and testimony has
been balanced against the trustworthiness of some hearsay evidence. The
result was a list of narrowly drawn exceptions to the rule. In fact, some
courts became so involved with categorical exceptions, they lost sight of
the rule's original purpose of insuring trustworthiness. It was against this
background that the hearsay rules were codified in Article VIII of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. While hearsay properly deserves a note of its
own, the discussion here will be confined to an overview of the article and
an analysis of its general exception provisions.
Rule 801'1 is a significant departure from the common law.13" ' Hearsay
130. (a) Statement.-A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) non-
verbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant.-A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay.-"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.-A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness.-The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A)
inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of
perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent
with his testimony and is offered to rebut express or implied charge against him of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or
(2) Admission by party-opponent.-The statement is offered against a party and
is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity or (B) a
statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject,
or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a state-
ment by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspir-
acy. FED. R. EVID. 801.
131. REDDEN & SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 246.
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is therein defined in common-law terms"' but exclusions, not exceptions,
mark the departure. Admissions and prior consistent and inconsistent
statements are no longer exceptions to the hearsay rule; they simply are
not hearsay. 13 While this may at first seem to be a startling departure, the
end result should be in keeping with common law principles.
34
There is, however, one important, although subtle, distinction that
should be noted. Rule 801(d)(2)(D) makes the statement of an agent or
servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment
admissible against his employer. No longer is there a requirement for the
employee to have been expressly authorized to make such a statement."5
Most employers will probably not appreciate the significance of this
change, and notice of this fact could eliminate some damaging future
testimony.
Rule 802 is a statement of hearsay inadmissibility coupled with a legisla-
tive restraint on judicial expansion of the existing rule."' As will be seen,
however, under the rule's general exception provisions 7 flexibility has not
been entirely foreclosed. Hearsay exceptions are specifically enumerated
in Rules 803 and 804, and both rules have liberalized existing common law
hearsay exceptions."' Rule 803, in the areas of business records,139 public
records, 4' learned treatises,' and previous convictions, 4' has significantly
132. Compare FED. R. Evm. 801(c) with McCoRMcK § 246, at 584.
133. FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(1), (2).
134. REDDEN & SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 249.
135. See Nuttall v. Holman, 110 Utah 375, 173 P.2d 1015 (1946); McCouMICK § 267.
136. "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED.
R. Evm. 802.
137. See note 148 infra and accompanying text.
138. See generally REDDEN & SALT URG, supra note 2, at 274-83, 312-16.
139. Records of regularly conducted activity.-A memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made
at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge,
if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness,
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indi-
cate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes
business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind,
whether or not conducted for profit. FED. R. EviD. 803(6).
140. Public records and reports.-Records, reports, statements, or data compila-
tions, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the
office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions
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expanded the scope of previous common law exceptionsY" Rule 804 has
similarly liberalized hearsay exceptions when the declarant is unavaila-
ble."' Unavailability is first defined in Rule 804(a)"' with the applicable
sections thereafter listed. Noteworthy departures from the common law are
found in dying declarations'48 and in statements against interest.'47
and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings re-
sulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the
sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. FED. R.
EVID. 803(8).
141. Learned treaties.-To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon
cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements contained
in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or
other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission
of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the
statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. FED. R.
EVID. 803(18).
142. Judgment of previous conviction.-Evidence of a final judgment, entered after
a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a
person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year,
to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered
by the Government in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment,
judgments against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may
be shown but does not affect admissibility. FED. R. Evm. 803(22).
143. See generally REDDEN & SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 274-83 for a detailed discussion
of Rule 803 and its variations from the common law of hearsay.
144. See generally REDDEN & SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 312-16.
145. Definition of unavailability.-"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in
which the declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement
despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable
to procure his attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)
(2), (3), or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of
his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying. FED. R.
EvID. 804(a).
146. In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement
made by a declarant while believing that his death was imminent, concerning the
cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death. FED. R. Evm.
804(b)(2).
147. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declar-
ant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or
criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasona-
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While the common-law expansions noted above are significant, the most
controversial exception is stated with identical language in both Rule 803
and 804.
Other exceptions.-A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness [is admissible] if the court determines that (A) the state-
ment is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it his intention to
offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address
of the declarant."8
This exception was adopted to insure continued flexibility in the hearsay
rule. "'49 In maintaining the viability of common law development, the ex-
ception also provides suitable guarantees of trustworthiness.
The Rules do not, however, contemplate unfettered judicial discre-
tion.10 In this regard, Rule 802 is one restraint,1 ' but it may be of minimal
ble man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be
true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. FED. R. EvED. 804(b)(3).
148. FED. R. Evm. 803(b)(5).
149. In discussing the general exception provisions of Rules 803 and 804, the Advisory
Committee noted that:
Exception (24). The preceding 23 exceptions of Rule 803 and the first five exceptions
of Rule 804(b), infra, are designed to take full advantage of the accumulated wisdom
and experience of the past in dealing with hearsay. It would, however, be presump-
tuous to assume that all possible desirable exceptions to the hearsay rule have been
catalogued and to pass the hearsay rule to oncoming generations as a closed system.
Exception (24) and its companion provision in Rule 804(b)(6) are accordingly included.
They do not contemplate an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion, but they do
provide for treating new and presently unanticipated situations which demonstrate a
trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions. Within this
framework, room is left for growth and development of the law of evidence in the
hearsay area, consistently with the broad purposes expressed in Rule 102. See Dallas
County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961). FED. R. Evm.
803 (Advisory Committee's Note (24)).
150. Id.
151. "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or other rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED. R. Evm.
802.
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effect depending on the judicial interpretation of the general exception in
Rules 803 and 804. A much more powerful restraint is found in the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution.15 The express right of con-
frontation is therein guaranteed for criminal cases and was emphasized by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade.153 This restraint was recog-
nized when the proposed rules were under consideration.' As a result of
this and similar criticisms, Rules 803 and 804 were clarified and made more
restrictive, protecting both criminal and civil defendants alike." 5
The approach taken by Congress to allow a natural expansion of the
hearsay exceptions has been urged by scholars for some time."' This ap-
proach has also found substantial support in the federal courts as illus-
trated by Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.," 7 wherein
the court had to determine the cause of a structure's collapse. A 50-year-
old newspaper clipping was introduced to explain the presence of charred
timbers and thus rebut a desired inference that lightning had caused the
collapse. While the clipping did not fit into any recognized hearsay excep-
tion, it was admitted as sufficiently trustworthy since the court did not
believe that a small-town reporter would report a fire that had not oc-
curred.
Although modem federal case law forms the basis for the flexible ap-
proach of the Rules, Virginia courts have consistently refused to depart
from the strict common law exceptions."8 Under existing state law, if the
evidence offered cannot be squeezed into an exception, it is inadmissible
152. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
153. 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to counsel at pretrial identification necessary to preserve a
meaningful confrontation at trial). See also Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96
(1963); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934);
Delaney v. United States, 263 U.S. 586 (1924). But see United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1
(1952) (selective service registrant denied access to his F.B.I. conscientous objector back-
ground report).
154. Judicial Conference, 48 F.R.D. 39, 55 (2d Cir. 1969). Proposed FED. R. EvrD. 803(24)
and 804(b)(5) read: "A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions
but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."
155. As specified in FED. R. EvD. 803(24), the statement must be evidence of a material
fact, more probative than any other reasonably available evidence, and best serve the inter-
ests of justice through its admission.
156. See V WIGMORE § 1427; McCORMICK § 327.
157. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961). See also United States v. 60.14 Acres of Land, 362 F.2d
660 (3d Cir. 1966); United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) and cases
cited therein.
158. See Facchina v. Richardson, 213 Va. 440, 192 S.E.2d 791 (1972) (plaintiff's lost wages
summary was hearsay but admission was harmless error); Coureas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198
Va. 77, 92 S.E.2d 378 (1956) (hearsay evidence incompetent and inadmissible unless it falls
within one of the recognized exceptions).
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hearsay no matter how clarifying, probative or essential it may be. '59 The
mechanics of the hearsay rule often overshadow its truth-seeking purpose
in Virginia.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the federal courts must now deal with a codified evidence
system, there should be few problems in transition. The Rules are basically
a concise statement of the common law with suitable flexibility.to allow
for growth and transition as the law changes. In the areas of presumption
and privilege the Rules have remained general to allow a gradual resolution
of federal-state conflicts. In using the Rules, one should interpret them
with their purpose in mind, and that purpose is to insure fair and efficient
justice.
G.G.R.
159. Facchina v. Richardson, 213 Va. 440, 192 S.E.2d 791 (1972).

